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LOCAL MEMORY ON WAR,  
GERMAN OCCUPATION  
AND POSTWAR YEARS
An oral history project in the Donbass
This article presents the findings of a small oral history project carried out during the 
years 2001-2010 in the Eastern Ukrainian Donbass region. The Donbass, located 
in today’s Eastern Ukraine, was until the 1960s the main coal region of the Soviet 
Union.1 Under Stalin’s forced industrialisation of the 1930s, the region experienced 
an enormous economic development and population growth, and became a leading 
industrial centre and “showcase region of socialism.” At the end of the 1930s, 
1. See for the history of the Donbass (among others): Hiroaki Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror 
in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s – 1990s (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Theodore H. Friedgut, Iuzovka and Revolution, Vol. 1, Life and 
Work in Russia’s Donbass, 1869-1924; Vol. 2, Politics and Revolution in Russia’s Donbass, 
1869-1924 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989-1994); Susan P. McCaffray, 
The Politics of Industrialization in Tsarist Russia: The Association of Southern Coal and Steel 
Producers, 1874-1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996); Charles Wynn, 
Workers, Strikes and Pogroms: The Donbass-Dnepr Bend in Late Imperial Russia, 1870-1905 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Daniel J. Walkowitz, 
Workers of the Donbass Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine, 1989-1992 (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1995); Tanja Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler: Leben 
und Arbeiten im Donbass 1929-1953 (Essen: Klartext, 2010). For the history of other parts 
of Ukraine under German rule in World War II see (among others) Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of 
Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004); Dieter 
Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
1996); D. Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische 
Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941-1944 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008); Thomas Sandkühler, 
“Endlösung” in Galizien: Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die Rettungsaktionen von Berthold 
Beitz (Bonn: Dietz, 1996); Christoph Mick, Kriegserfahrungen in einer multiethnischen Stadt: 
Lemberg 1914-1947 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010); Andrej Angrick, Besatzungspolitik 
und Massenmord: Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion 1941-1943 (Hamburg: 
Hamburger Edition, 2003); Karl Heinz Roth, Jan-Peter Abraham, Reemtsma auf der Krim: 
Tabakproduktion und Zwangsarbeit unter der deutschen Besatzungsherrschaft 1941–1944 
(Hamburg: Nautilus, 2011).
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the Donbass was the Soviet Ukrainian region with the highest industrialisation 
and urbanisation rates. The 1930s were formative for the development of a strictly 
hierarchical Stalinist social order and Stalinist work relationships. At the same 
time, the population’s working and living conditions were extremely bad and 
comprised various violent measures – forced mobilisation of the workforce in the 
countryside, deportations of workers from the annexed Western Ukraine in 1939, 
or numerous political purges of workers and engineers. Nevertheless, the Stalinist 
regime succeeded in making many people believe in a “bright future” through 
various means of social mobilisation such as work stimulation (as for instance the 
Stakhanov movement) and propaganda. In many respects, during the first Five-
year plans, the Donbass was a test field for the Stalinist regime’s industrialisation, 
modernisation and political alignment efforts.
During World War II, parts of the Donbass were occupied over 22 months by the 
German Wehrmacht. The German occupation authorities undertook great efforts to 
rebuild and exploit the mines, which had been destroyed by the Red Army during 
retreat. Next to 1,800 German mining specialists, about 90,000 local miners – a 
quarter of them women – and around 20,000 Soviet prisoners of war were employed 
in the mines. Besides the workers who had to work for the Germans in the occupied 
territories, more than 350,000 Soviet citizens were deported from the Donbass as 
Ostarbeiter to Germany. In some cases, working in the Donbass mines could save 
local miners from deportation to Germany. An important role for the reconstruction 
of the mines and their successful exploitation was played by numerous local Soviet 
engineers who tried to improve their living conditions by collaborating with the 
Germans. Altogether, significant reconstruction work took place under German 
occupation and coal output increased. However, prewar production levels were only 
partly reached due to the immense destruction of the mines. The local population’s 
work experience under German occupation bore many similarities with their 
earlier experience of the Soviet: forced recruitments and deportations were not 
totally new for the Donbass inhabitants – even if the degree of violence reached 
a new level under the Germans. Under German occupation, the population of the 
Donbass experienced extreme mass terror and violence. According to the Soviet 
Extraordinary Commission, in Donets´k (Stalino) region alone, mass graves with 
more than 323,000 victims (174,000 civilians and 149,000 Soviet prisoners of war) 
were discovered after the liberation.2 However, just as it was under Soviet rule, 
everyday life under the Germans cannot be characterised only by terror and violence. 
It was an effective combination of terror, incentives and propaganda. The Germans’ 
“new order” was not so new for the civilian population of the region, and in many 
respects was in keeping with what they had experienced under Stalinist rule.
The experience of “forced labour” continued in the postwar Soviet Union. 
After the liberation by Soviet troops, forced labour and deportation in the 
2. See the report by the Extraordinary Commission dated 30 May 1945 about German crimes in 
Stalino (Donets´k) region, in: GARF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii), f. 7021, 
op. 72, d. 811, l. 12 f; Penter, Kohle für Stalin, 232 ff.
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postwar Donbass were concentrated in various ways. New large contingents of 
unfree workers were used as workforce in the reconstruction of the coal mines 
– for the most part German prisoners of war, so called “mobilised” German 
civilians, and repatriated Soviet citizens who had been deported to Germany as 
prisoners of war or Ostarbeiter. Thus, in postwar times, the Donbass resembled 
a large forced labour camp. At the same time, the Stalinist government had to 
recognize that the experience of German occupation had changed the attitudes 
of the population towards Soviet power. The war had given the returning Soviet 
citizens who had been deported to Germany and the civilians who had lived under 
German occupation the opportunity to look behind the “iron curtain” and get 
into contact with West European culture. In this respect, the experience of work 
under German rule played an important role. In postwar years, Soviet citizens who 
had worked for the Germans in the occupied territories or in Germany became 
stigmatised and discriminated against as traitors. This was part of an all-embracing 
new categorisation and hierarchical organization of the population by the State. 
The regime drew certain conclusions about the potential loyalty of Soviet citizens 
and their attitude towards the State on the basis of their specific wartime experience 
(as Red Army soldiers, inhabitants of the occupied territories, evacuees, repatriated 
Soviet prisoners of war, Ostarbeiter, or inhabitants of the newly annexed western 
territories and others). It punished disloyal and rewarded loyal behaviour. 
Furthermore, a broad, uncompromising purge was launched against the members 
of the Communist party who had stayed in occupied territory, and – in a much 
more pragmatic way – against skilled workers. The individual position inside the 
new social hierarchy went along with different freedom rights, food supply and 
general living conditions. 
Methodological considerations of the oral history project
In our oral history project, we interviewed 58 local people about their experiences 
during the 22 months of German occupation during World War II and about 
their pre- and postwar lives.3 In Russia and Ukraine, oral history became a field 
of academic research only quite recently, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Since the 1990s, several oral-history centres have been founded in St. Petersburg, 
Voronezh, Barnaul and Petrozavodsk.4 The Memorial centre of oral history and 
biography in Moscow has also played an important role. In Ukraine, the oral 
history discipline is still less institutionalized than in Russia, but the Ukrainian 
Oral History Association, based in Harkiv, was founded in 2006. Most of the oral 
3. See Dmitrii Titarenko, Tanja Penter, Mne kazhetsia, chto v okkupatsii moi polzhizni 
proshli…” Opyt natsistskoi okkupatsii i poslevoennykh let v Donbasse (po vospominaniiam 
ochevidtsev), Donets´k (forthcoming in summer 2012).
4. For an overview of oral history research in Russia see Irina Rebrova, “Oral History im 
heutigen Russland. Tätigkeitsfeld, Probleme und Perspektiven,” BIOS, 22, 2 (2009): 293-300. 
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history projects in Russia and Ukraine focus on World War II and often deal with 
specific victim groups, mostly Jewish survivors and deported Ostarbeiter.5
For our oral history project in the Donbass, there were three methodological 
considerations that were of special importance. First, the regional approach of the 
oral history project: focusing on the population of the Donbass region enabled 
us to include and compare the diverse occupation experiences, memories and 
perceptions of different population groups. Unlike interview projects, which focus 
on single victim groups, our regional approach tries to give a more comprehensive 
perspective on the population’s multiple and sometimes competing experiences 
of the occupation. For Ukraine, this regional approach is particularly interesting 
because it helps analyse the seemingly heterogenous regional memory cultures, 
especially the gap between East and West. 
Historians have so far commonly accepted that the population in different 
historical regions of Ukraine (especially in the older Soviet territories of Central 
and Eastern Ukraine and in the Western Ukrainian territories annexed in 1939) 
experienced war and German occupation quite differently. This appears in 
heterogenous regional memory cultures, in which Soviet and national Ukrainian 
symbols and traditions intertwine in complicated ways.6 While in Central and Eastern 
Ukraine, the memory of the victory in the “Great Patriotic War” is still dominant 
and Red Army soldiers are perceived as liberators, in Western Ukraine many people 
primarily see the War as a fight of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organisation (OUN) 
against Soviet occupation. Generally, many different narratives about the history of 
Ukraine during World War II have existed so far.
Second, the focus on everyday life experiences under German occupation: in 
our oral history project, we tried to include the various everyday life and working 
experiences and the cultural perceptions of the population as well as experiences of 
terror, repression and violence under German occupation.
Third, the chronological frame of the project: the interviews followed a 
narrative biographical approach7 which included the interviewees’ pre- and 
5. See for example Alexander von Plato, Almut Leh, Christoph Thonfeld, eds., Hitlers Sklaven: 
Lebensgeschichtliche Analysen zur Zwangsarbeit im internationalen Vergleich (Wien, Köln, 
Weimar: Böhlau, 2008); G.G. Grinchenko, Nevygadane usni istorii ostarbajteriv (Kharkiv, 
2004); Boris Zabarko, ed., “Nur wir haben überlebt”: Holocaust in der Ukraine. Zeugnisse 
und Dokumente (Köln: Dittrich, 2004); P. Desbois, Der vergessene Holocaust: Die Ermordung 
der ukrainischen Juden. Eine Spurensuche (Berlin, 2009). For a local approach, focussing on 
the experiences of the occupation in a village in Pskov region see Zhanna Kormina, Sergei 
Shtyrkov, “Niemand und nichts ist vergessen. Die Okkupation in mündlichen Zeugnissen,” 
Osteuropa, 55, 4-6 (2005): 444-461.
6. See Stefan Troebst, Wilfried Jilge, eds., “Divided Historical Cultures? World War II and 
Historical Memory in Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 
54, 1 (2006).
7. See for a narrative biographical interview approach Alexander von Plato, “Zeitzeugen und 
die historische Zunft. Erinnerung, kommunikative Tradierung und kollektives Gedächtnis 
in der qualitativen Geschichtswissenschaft – ein Problemaufriss,” BIOS. Zeitschrit für 
Biographieforschung und Oral History, 13, 1 (2000): 5-29, here 21-25. For methodological 
considerations about oral history see Lutz Niethammer, “Fragen – Antworten – Fragen. 
Methodische Erfahrungen und Erwägungen zur Oral History,” in L. Niethammer, A. von Plato, 
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postwar experiences. During the interviews, we noticed that several interviewees 
established links between their experiences at different time periods. Besides, they 
tended, from their more total biographical perspective, to combine and correlate 
their experience of Nazi and Stalinist rule, which sometimes opened interesting 
comparative perspectives. In some cases, the subjective meaning of their war 
experience pervaded their biographical narrative. Historians, who have so far 
tended to study Stalinism and German occupation as separate topics, could learn 
from the witness accounts’ more integrated perspective.
Finally it should be mentioned that our previous studies of the history of the 
Donbass from the 1930s to the 1950s on the basis of archival documents have 
enabled us to place individual narratives into context.8
The interviews were open and did not follow a firm set of questions. We normally 
interviewed people at home, to create as relaxed and pleasant an interview situation 
as possible. Concerning the selection of interviewees, we tried to embrace a wide 
range of experiences, including those of Jews and Non-Jews, men and women, 
children and adults, townspeople and country people, ordinary people, as well as 
resisters or deported Ostarbeiter. However, the selection of interviewees nonetheless 
remains a methodological problem and cannot be considered representative without 
constraints. We could not interview those who experienced the worst treatment under 
German occupation. Neither did we interview those who actively collaborated with 
the Germans. Besides, most of the available interviewees belonged to the younger 
generation, and had experienced German rule as young adults or adolescents, a fact 
which affected their perception of the occupation.9
Memory accounts by former Soviet citizens
According to Harald Welzer, witness accounts must be considered as target 
group related constructions, in which biographical experiences are each time 
newly formed and presented according to narrative and normative necessities 
as well as knowledge that was acquired later10. As the French sociologist 
eds., “Wir kriegen jetzt andere Zeiten”: Auf der Suche nach der Erfahrung des Volkes in 
nachfaschistischen Ländern (Berlin: J.H.W. Dietz, 1985), 392-445.
8. Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler; Dmytro Tytarenko, Presa schidnoï Ukraïny periodu 
nimets´ko-fashysts´koï okupatsiï jak istorychne dzherelo (1941-1943rr.), doctoral dissertation, 
Donets´k, 2002.
9. A stronger interest in children’s war experiences appeared in historical science only in the 
1990s, following earlier studies in the fields of psychotherapy and gerontology. See among 
others: Margarete Dörr, Der Krieg hat uns geprägt: Wie Kinder den Zweiten Weltkrieg 
erlebten, (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2007, 2 vol.). For the former Soviet Union see 
Svetlana A. Aleksievich, Die letzten Zeugen: Kinder im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Aufbau-
Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005); “Kinder des Krieges,” Bulletin des Deutschen Historischen 
Instituts Moskau, 3, (2009).
10. Harald Welzer, “Das Interview als Artefakt: Zur Kritik der Zeitzeugenforschung,” BIOS, 
Zeitschrit für Biographieforschung und Oral History, 13, 1 (2000): 51-63, here 60.
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Maurice Halbwachs has shown, individual memory is always formed by social 
interaction and communication. It is constructed and confirmed by communication 
and exchange with other human beings on the one hand and by cultural interactions 
with media, material representations (texts, images, memorial sites) and symbolic 
practices (rituals, festivals) on the other.11 Interviews with witnesses can only to 
a very limited scale serve historians for the reconstruction of historical events. 
They mainly reflect how the interviewee perceives these historical events from 
today’s perspective. This had led researchers to pay attention to the changes of 
individual and collective memory narratives in the course of time.12 
It is also important to note that historical-political debates and political 
transformation processes, including the resulting changes in official historiography 
and official memory culture, influence private memory. Individual or family 
memories always correlate with the official historiography and memory culture of a 
society and the “master narrative” of a nation.13 In the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, several specifics must be noted: until the end of the Soviet Union, official 
remembrance policies were dominated by the mythification and overestimation of 
resistance and the partisan movement. At the same time, other aspects of the history 
of German occupation, for example the Holocaust, the question of collaboration, 
or forced labour imposed by the Germans on Soviet citizens, were suppressed and 
mostly excluded from any public discussion and collective memory culture. After 
the war, millions of Soviets who had lived under German rule were considered 
potential “enemies of the people,” and for decades official questionnaires 
included the question whether the person has lived in occupied territory. During 
the interviews, we were surprised by the fact that special groups like deported 
Ostarbeiter and Soviet prisoners of war did not solely feel these discriminations 
and stigmatizations in postwar times. Many ordinary people who had just lived 
in occupied territory felt them as well. Many of the interviewees mentioned certain 
restrictions concerning education and job opportunities or travel abroad as well as 
a permanent mistrust by Soviet officials. One interviewee, who was 14 years old at 
the time of the German occupation of Stalino/Donets´k, recalled: 
There was general mistrust towards the people who had stayed in occupied 
territory. We were like traitors. […] The discrimination was not so open. It was 
more subliminal. But people felt that they were not full-fledged members of the 
11. Maurice Halbwachs, Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen (Frankfurt a.M., 
1985); M. Halbwachs, Das kollektive Gedächtnis Frankfurt a.M. 1985; Aleida Assmann, 
Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 2006), 31-36.
12. See among others Piotr Filipkowski, “Polnische Lagernarrative in Zeit und Kontext,” in 
Andreas Ehresmann, Philipp Neumann, Alexander Prenninger, Regis Schagdenhauffen, eds., 
Die Erinnerung an die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager: Akteure, Inhalte, Strategien 
(Berlin: Metropol, 2011): 23-43.
13. Harald Welzer, ed., Der Krieg der Erinnerung: Holocaust, Kollaboration und Widerstand 
im europäischen Gedächtnis (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007), 17-18.
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collective. At my work place – I was a book keeper –, I always sensed that the 
attitude towards me was different from the attitude towards the evacuees.14 
Discriminations against those who had worked for the enemy under the occupation 
were particularly severe. A woman who had worked in a briquette factory under 
German rule recalled her stressful experiences after the war: 
When our troops arrived, we were terrorized because we had stayed in occupied 
territory. We were despised because we had lived under German occupation. 
Later, when I went to the social security office, I was told that I had worked for 
the Germans. Wouldn’t they have worked for the Germans if a pistol had been 
held to their head? That’s how it is. I am suffering terribly from this. Yes, I am 
even scared to remember these things. It was horrible. We were despised. Why? 
Were we criminals in any way?15
Of course there were gradual differences and the stigmatization and repression against 
millions of people could not be as severe as in the case of the forced labourers and 
prisoners of war, who were deported to Germany during the war and later repatriated.16 
We also learned from some interviewees that a more pragmatic policy was pursued 
toward specialists who were needed for Soviet reconstruction, even if they had worked 
for the Germans. Nevertheless, these millions of Soviet citizens who had lived in 
occupied territory avoided to speak openly about their war experiences for decades. 
The families often were the only place where these things could be addressed. Many 
interviews give evidence that memories were passed on in the families from generation 
to generation. This is often expressed by remarks like “according to what my mother 
told me.” Children and grandchildren picked up some elements of the memories of the 
older generation which they integrated into their own memories, thereby combining 
their own experiences with stories of their parents or grandparents.17 As several 
interviewees mentioned, their children asked them to commit their memories to paper 
so that they did not fall into oblivion. These stories were not to be told outside of the 
narrow private family circle, as one interviewee reported: 
My grandmother always raised us to keep silent about the things which were 
spoken about at home. That is what she taught us. She was a very smart woman.18
14. Interview with Valentina I. (1927), recorded in December 2003 in Donets´k.
15. Interview with Vera P. (1922), recorded in June 2001 in Donets´k.
16. See for the repatriation of former forced laborers and POWs from Kiev: Tetjana 
Pastuschenko, Das Niederlassen von Repatrierten in Kiew ist verboten… Die Lage von 
ehemaligen Zwangsarbeiter/innen und Kriegsgefangenen in der Ukraine nach dem Krieg 
(Kiev: IIU, 2011). Pastuschenko also uses oral history interviews in her innovative work.
17. The family constitutes an interface between individual and public memory. See for 
family memory, Halbwachs, Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen, 203-242. 
For comparative research on family memory about World War II in different countries 
see Welzer, ed., Der Krieg der Erinnerung.
18. Interview with Boris R. (1933), recorded in February 2005 in Donets´k.
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union in independent Ukraine, a reinterpretation 
of Soviet historiography under new national paradigms took place. For the first 
time, Stalinist crimes could be researched and discussed. Several interviewees thus 
mentioned that they had only recently learned about them, and they incorporated 
this new knowledge in their accounts. Furthermore it might be of importance that 
the interview project coincided with the German Forced Labour Compensation 
Programmme during the years 2000-2006.19 In the post-Soviet states, compensation 
programmes have functioned as a catalyst for historical-political debates since the 
1990s. As a result, former forced labourers were for the first time acknowledged as 
victims of National Socialism in their homeland societies. Numerous memoirs in 
prose or verse by former Ostarbeiter were published and theatre plays on the topic 
performed in the Ukrainian capital Kiev. At the same time, it must be noted that 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many elderly people in Ukraine suffered 
from poverty and very hard economic conditions. All these political, social and 
economic transformations surely influenced our interviewees’ narratives and must 
be taken into account. 
These historical and political factors may also explain why most of the 
interviewees showed a strong disposition and wish to talk about their personal 
experiences. Telling about the past often proceeds from an individual need for 
identity building.20 This seems especially true for post-Soviet societies, and one 
must take into consideration the fact that here, public memory accounts about the 
war may fulfil a special social purpose which has to do with social acknowledgement 
and status on the one hand and with search for orientation and community in times 
of disorder and confusion on the other.
Memory and historical facts
Does this mean that the interviews are rather useless for the reconstruction of 
historical events because of their subjective memory constructions? Again, the 
interview practice shows that in the countries of the former Soviet Union the situation 
seems to be special. Interviewees often recalled events that were not mentioned in 
Soviet historiography and official Soviet memory culture at all. More often than 
not, there exist no archival documents on these facts. Some accounts are in keeping 
with the new post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography, which after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union initiated a comprehensive revision of Soviet historiography, 
especially with regard to Stalinist crimes. However, the accounts sometimes come 
19. An international project at Bochum University has researched this German compensation 
programme and its various results for the post-Soviet countries. See for the compensation of 
forced labourers in Ukraine the article by Julia Landau and for the compensation programme 
in Belarus and Russia the articles by Tanja Penter in the forthcoming volume, Constantin 
Goschler, ed., Die Entschädigung von NS-Zwangsarbeit am Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts, 
(Göttingen, 2012, Vol. 4), 104-279. 
20. Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit.
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onto aspects of the history of the occupation that are still tabooed in Ukrainian 
historiography, as for example the question of collaboration. In these cases 
the interviews represent an impressive counter-narrative to the official version. 
This narrative has partly been passed on by family memory to the next generation. 
In authoritarian societies, family memory may fulfil a special purpose due to the 
fact that individual memory stores facts which are absent from the allowed official 
memory culture. Memories which conflict with official memory are often confined 
to the privacy of family. But they still show the inner limits of totalitarian regimes. 
Thus, Peter Burke speaks of the “power of unofficial memory” which is hard to 
break, even by totalitarian regimes.21
At the end of our oral history project, we noted that the memories of the war 
generation can, at least to a limited extent, serve for the construction of a new post-
Soviet local and regional history of wartime years which otherwise would be totally 
lost due to the lack of other materials. As Aleida Assmann has noted quite judiciously, 
positivistic historiography reaches its limits where archival resources are lacking, 
and here oral testimonies can help overcome these boundaries.22 The capture of 
the city of Stalino/Donets´k by the Germans offers a vivid example. According to the 
official Soviet version, the city was captured on 26 October 1941 after several days 
of serious street battles, in which more than 50,000 German soldiers were captured, 
killed or injured. Contrary to that, several former citizens of Stalino reported in their 
interviews that the city was captured by the Germans on 20 October 1941 and almost 
without a fight. This version is confirmed by German documents.23
Moreover, the interviewees reported on other facts which are completely missing 
from the Soviet historiography on the war, such as the total destruction of local 
industries by NKVD and Red Army units during their retreat or the execution of 
local prison inmates. As several respondents recalled, NKVD units had executed 
the prisoners in Stalino.24 Among the prisoners were, apart from criminals, ordinary 
workers who had committed no other crime than coming late to work or leaving 
work without permission. They had been sentenced to prison under the Stalinist 1940 
labour discipline law. All these prisoners were shot by the NKVD during retreat. 
Other interviewees reported about the planned destruction of the coal mines: 
They came to blow up the mine. A command of sappers arrived and they blasted 
away at the mine. At that time people ran to the mine, everybody came to the 
mine. We won’t allow you to destroy everything. What shall we live on? You 
will leave and what shall we live on? Shall we starve? […] There was such panic 
21. See Peter Burke, “Geschichte als soziales Gedächtnis,” in Aleida Assmann, Dietrich Harth, 
eds., Mnemosyne. Formen und Funktionen der kulturellen Erinnerung (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991), 289-304, here 300.
22. Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit, 47.
23. RGVA (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv, f. 1458, op. 40, d. 221, l. 280; RGVA, 
f. 1458, op. 40, d. 221, l. 280; Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (Freiburg), RH 24, Bl. 49.
24. Interview with Alexei A. (1923) recorded in July 2009 in selo Novonikolaievka/Donets´k 
region and Ivan S. (1927), recorded in October 2004 in Donets´k.
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and they wanted to prevent the explosion of the mine. But then there was an 
encirclement. All the people were dispersed, the mine was blown up and two 
days later the Germans arrived.25 
The huge destructions of the Donbass coal mines and the shootings of prisoners 
before the Red Army’s retreat are confirmed by German documents.26
The destruction of grain by the Red Army during retreat was a common theme 
in the accounts. The burning of the grain was perceived by many interviewees as 
a symbol of the fact that the population was virtually left to its own devices and 
exposed to hunger and starvation. Stalin’s “burned earth” policy and the significant 
destruction of the Donbass coal mines was a taboo topic in Soviet times. The Soviet 
side on its part had always emphasized the large-scale destruction wreaked by the 
Germans during their retreat from Donbass two years later.
First results of the oral history project in the Donbass
In this review of the main findings of our oral history project, we will pay special 
attention to the question of how the interviewees dealt with German rule in 
relation to pre- and postwar Stalinist rule and especially how they dealt with Nazi 
and Stalinist crimes. We will also analyze how respondents depicted the Germans 
and local collaborators. 
Firstly it can be noted that most of the interviewees perceived the relatively 
short period of German occupation as being of central importance in their lives. 
This is for example expressed in statements like: “It seems to me that under the 
occupation half of my life passed by. I remember every single day. My God, what 
a horrible time it was!”27 Moreover, the memories are often impressively detailed. 
Many interviewees remembered the first names of Germans they came into contact 
with. Others could still recall German songs which they learned from the occupiers, 
and sometimes started to sing them during the interview. 
The subjective importance of the relatively short period of the occupation 
for many interviewees might be explained by the general importance of youth 
experiences for the formation of a person’s identity. According to the sociologist 
Karl Mannheim, the experiences of human beings between the age of 12 and 25 remain 
constitutional for the whole process of personality shaping. Therefore, members of a 
historical generation share a common identity with regard to convictions, attitudes, 
worldviews, social values and cultural patterns of interpretation.28 However, the 
25. Interview with Viktor D. (1928), recorded in April 2004 in Donets´k.
26. See Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler, 179ff.
27. Interview with Maia P. (1925), recorded in January 2005 in Donets´k.
28. Karl Mannheim, “Das Problem der Generationen,” in Kurt H. Wolff, ed., Karl Mannheim, 
Wissenssoziologie: Auswahl aus dem Werk (Berlin, Neuwied: H. Luchterhand, 1964), 509-565; 
Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit, 26.
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detailed and minute memorization might also be explained by the extraordinary 
singularity of the experience for the interviewees.
Moreover we must notice that today, the historical meaning and importance 
of German occupation is seen quite differently in the memory cultures of the 
various occupied countries in Europe.29 The relative importance of the German 
occupation for former Soviet citizens might also be explained by the fact that for 
many of them – due to the iron curtain – it was their first (and sometimes only) 
contact with Westerners and in so far (at least for some of them) also constituted 
an important cultural experience. Moreover, it must be taken into account that 
for decades, most of the interviewees had had no opportunity to process their 
wartime experiences or to talk openly and publicly about them. This, too, might 
possibly explain the generally significant importance of that time period for the 
interviewees and their strong wish to talk about it. For the former stigmatized 
groups such as forced labourers, telling about their past fulfilled functions of 
social acknowledgement as victims of National Socialism, as one former 
Ostarbeiter recalled: 
Of course people’s attitudes have changed. Now we are acknowledged by 
everybody. This year, our raion celebrated its 85th anniversary. We were invited 
to the celebration. I addressed the audience, spoke about Germany. With tears in 
my eyes, I expressed thanks for being accepted into society. Before that, it was 
as if we were not part of it.30
At the same time, it must be noted that the reactions of Ukrainian society towards 
the compensation programmes were sometimes quite ambivalent. Several former 
Ostarbeiter recalled that they experienced jealousy and resentment from their 
neighbours, especially from those who lived under German occupation and did 
not receive any compensation. The payment programmes thus created new social 
tensions and competition among the war generation. Many elderly people are still 
convinced that most Ostarbeiter went to Germany voluntarily. And the official 
memory book of the victims of the Second World War in Donets´k region (“Kniga 
Pamiati Ukrainy”), which is financed by the Ukrainian government, has not to this 
day mentioned the deported Ostarbeiter at all.31
A further observation must be added here. When we analyzed the interviews, 
we sometimes noted huge differences in content and form between the narratives. 
29. See for Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Serbia and Croatia, Harald Welzer, 
Claudia Lenz, “Opa in Europa. Erste Befunde einer vergleichenden Tradierungsforschung,” 
in Welzer, ed., Der Krieg der Erinnerung, 7-40.
30. Interview with Alexandra B. (1926), recorded in July 2009 in Zaitsevo, Raion Artemovsk, 
Donets´k region.
31. See for this question in detail, Dmytro Tytarenko, “‘Deutsches Geld’ für die Zwangsarbeiter. 
Die Reaktionen der Bevölkerung des Gebiets Donezk auf die Auszahlungen der Stiftung 
‘Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft’,” in Goschler, ed., Die Entschädigung von 
NS-Zwangsarbeit, 281-306.
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For instance, the narratives of former members of resistance movements, who already 
in Soviet times could at least partly talk about their war experiences publicly, often 
seemed to follow a certain pattern. We got the impression that these interviewees 
had repeated their narratives many times, for example in forms of ritualized public 
accounts for school children or inside their former resistance circle. In contrast 
with the stories of other groups of the war generation, theirs were to a great extent 
part of the official Soviet memory culture. Frequent repetition had given these 
memories a more stable form and structure. Even in post-Soviet times, the partisans 
and resistance fighters still perpetuate their old Soviet memory narratives, which 
seemingly form a strong part of their identity. Compared to this, the narratives of 
other interviewees, non-resisters, appeared to be much more open, fragmentary and 
fragile and did not follow these patterns. In some cases, those witnesses had the 
possibility to formulate a coherent narrative of their life experiences for the first 
time. Surprisingly, in both cases the accounts were sometimes accompanied by 
emotional outbreaks.
Experiences under the occupation
Looking at everyday life under German rule, it becomes clear that terror was one 
of the main experiences of the population. Some of the interviewees described 
the feeling of being at the absolute mercy of the occupying Germans: “We were 
completely without any rights. We had no rights or laws. The Germans were the 
masters and absolute rulers. And we were slaves, real slaves.”32
However, terror was never absolute, and the interviewees mentioned other spheres 
of contact and interrelation between Germans and locals in which experiences 
were different. In several respects, the experience of work was crucial in building 
the identity – and loyalty – of the population before, during and after the German 
occupation. Under German rule, about 90,000 Soviet coal miners and 20,000 Soviet 
prisoners of war worked under the supervision of 1,800 German mining specialists 
in the Donbass coal mines. Apart from that, more than 330,000 Ostarbeiter were 
deported to Germany.33 These numbers show that many of the Soviet workers had 
direct contact with German supervisors. Experiences at the workplace were quite 
different. Working together, local workers and German supervisors sometimes 
even formed friendly relations, as a former coal miner recalled: 
Our Germans were coal miners. These Germans, who worked together with us 
miners, did no harm to anybody. Because they understood us and even told 
us that they were workers just like we were.34 
32. Interview with Zoia Tch. (1929), recorded in February 2005 in Donets´k.
33. See Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler. 
34. Interview with Valentin N. (1926), recorded in June 2001 in Donets´k.
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In some cases, working in the local mines saved the workers from forced deportation 
to Germany, as several interviewees reported.35 The meaning of these contacts for 
the interviewees was evidenced by the fact that 60 years later, some still remembered 
the first names of some German workers and the places in Germany that they came 
from. Other interviewees remembered the brutality of German supervisors and their 
contemptuous treatment of the workers, as for example a woman who worked in the 
coal mines as a 15-year old girl and was publicly beaten by a German supervisor 
for leaving work without permission.36 Sometimes, workers who refused to work 
were even executed by the Germans.37 Most interestingly, several interviewees 
experienced their work under German rule as especially orderly and organized – 
some of them even referred to a certain German pedantism – and compared it to 
their much more undisciplined and chaotic work experiences before and after the 
war.38 The “work for the enemy” was a central experience which the majority of 
the population shared and which has been understudied so far with regard to its 
consequences for postwar developments.39 
Concerning the German Vernichtungspolitik (“policy of extermination”), it is 
striking that the murder of prisoners of war in occupied Donbass was more ingrained 
in memories than the murder of Jews. This is due to the fact that the execution of 
Soviet prisoners of war took place in the Donbass on a much larger scale and during 
a longer time period and was quite visible to the local population. According to 
reports of the Extraordinary Commission, around 150,000 Soviet prisoners of war 
died in German camps in the Donbass. The number of Jewish victims in the Donbass 
was considerably smaller and accounted for approximately 18,000 (according to 
estimates).40 The “Jewish question” was resolved by the Germans much faster and 
less visibly. 
In many interviews we saw that locals tried to provide the starving prisoners of 
war with food, thus taking the risk of being executed by German officers: 
The prisoners of war died from hunger and in the open air […] At that time, 
seeing this, people understood who the Germans were and how they behaved. 
Here they showed their real essence. Officially it was not allowed to help 
the prisoners of war […] but the people threw whatever they could behind 
the barbed-wire fence. […] But the Germans punished this strictly. They drove 
them away from the fence, beat and humiliated them.41 
35. Interview with Valentina Tch. (1921), recorded in May 2004 in Donets´k.
36. Interview with Aleksandra P. (1927), recorded in June 2001 in Donets´k.
37. Interview with Viktor S. (1929), recorded in October 2004 in Donets´k.
38. Interview with Valentin N. (1926), recorded in June 2001 in Donets´k.
39. Tanja Penter, “Die Ukrainer und der ‘Große Vaterländische Krieg’: Die Komplexität der 
Kriegsbiographien, in Andreas Kappeler, ed., Die Ukraine. Prozesse der Nationsbildung (Köln: 
Böhlau, 2011), 335-348.
40. For a detailed analysis, see Penter, Kohle für Stalin und Hitler, 234ff.
41. Interview with Viktor Z. (1927), recorded in March 2004 in Mariupol´.
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It has been argued that if the Germans had not prevented the population from 
supplying the prisoners of war with food, there would have been considerably less 
starvation among them.42 
It is impossible to quantify the help and support that the local population gave to 
the prisoners of war. It seems to us, however, that the narratives may have fulfilled 
another purpose, that of helping postwar society compensate for subconscious 
feelings of guilt. In this respect, the Soviet prisoner of war motive bears several 
parallels with the widespread German accounts about the sandwiches that the 
German population allegedly gave to the deported Ostarbeiter.
Only a limited number of interviewees mentioned similar support for their Jewish 
neighbours, which might partly be explained by the fact that those who helped Jews 
took the risk of being sentenced to death by the Germans. Nevertheless, some locals 
helped Jews by hiding them in their homes.
The attitudes of non-Jews towards their Jewish neighbours varied, as one 
interviewee recalled: 
Some openly hated them [the Jews], others remained silent. Well, firstly not 
everybody knew about it [the execution of Jews]. […] And then, when they 
learned about it, those who hated them were pleased about it. But others mourned 
because they were human beings. It was rather varied. 43
It must also be noted that official remembrance policies and schoolbooks in post-
Soviet Ukraine still treat the Holocaust as a rather marginal event and do not 
integrate it into national Ukrainian history. As a result, the dark side of that period 
is excluded from the national narrative, and so is the rescue of numerous Jews by 
their courageous Ukrainian neighbours. In this respect, Ukrainian public memory 
culture seems, at least to some extent, to perpetuate old Soviet remembrance 
policies which suppressed the Jewish memory of the Holocaust.44
Depicting the German occupiers
Regarding the general depiction of the Germans made in the narratives, it is 
striking that there are as many stories about “good Germans” as stories about 
“bad Germans,” independently of the fact whether the interviewer was German 
or Ukrainian. Even though racism, cruelty and a feeling of superiority were 
common characterizations of the Germans in many interviews, we also heard 
42. Karel C. Berkhoff, “The ‘Russian’ Prisoners of War in Nazi-Ruled Ukraine as Victims of 
Genocidal Massacre,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 15 (2001): 1-32.
43. Interview with Boris R. (1933), recorded in February 2005 in Donets´k.
44. See Wilfried Jilge, “Competing victimhoods – Post-Soviet Ukrainian Narratives on World 
War II,” in Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth A. Cole, Kai Struve, eds., Shared History – Divided 
Memory. Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939-1941 (Leipzig: Leipziger 
Universitätsverlag, 2007), 103-133, here 115-119.
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many stories about German soldiers who provided locals with food, showed 
them photographs of their children or gave Christmas presents to them. When 
the army units moved further on, farewell photographs were taken and local 
women cried.45 Women who accommodated officers were looked at with 
jealousy, because, in return for sexual favours, these officers normally provided 
the whole family with food.46 Many interviewees mentioned the contacts with 
German soldiers and officers who were quartered in their homes, as well as barter 
deals, black markets, prostitution, and relationships between Soviet women and 
Germans, which interviewees did not generally condemn, but attributed to the 
hard living conditions of women. Others remembered cultural experiences with 
German cinema – Soviet people often perceived the German entertainment films 
as immoral.
The Jewish population’s much too positive picture of the Germans before the 
occupation, which probably resulted from experiences from World War I, turned 
out to be fatal. Thus, one Jewish respondent mentioned that positive expectations of 
the Germans prevented some Jewish families from evacuating. He recalled: 
When the period of occupation came closer, my father said: “I know the Germans 
quite well. I have talked to them. They are a quite cultured and hard-working 
people. I don’t believe what is written in the press. We will stay here. […] 
That is all communist propaganda. That cannot be true. The Germans are orderly, 
respectable people.”47 
The interviewee’s family, despite this fatal misjudgment, wondrously managed to 
survive the occupation with fake Russian passports.
All these stories show that the range of memories and narratives is quite 
wide. While official Soviet propaganda and historiography propagated a rather 
dehumanized picture of the enemy, individual memories recall various human 
relationships between occupiers and the occupied population, including hatred, 
friendship and sometimes even love. Thus, an interviewee who experienced the war 
as an eight-year-old boy recalled: 
The best thing in the time of occupation was when this curious, unexpected 
friendship with this German driver developed, and he gave me a pocket knife 
as present.48 
But in another situation, the same interviewee reported about the feeling of mortal 
fear when another German had beaten him brutally. These everyday relationships 
45. Interview with Nina K. (1931), recorded in December 2004 in Konstantinovka.
46. Interview with Lev V. (1924), recorded in May 2005 in Donets´k.
47. Interview with Lev V. (1924), recorded in May 2005 in Donets´k.
48. Interview with Boris R. (1933), recorded in February 2005 in Donets´k.
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between occupiers and occupied as well as their mutual perceptions need to be 
studied much more carefully.
Many interviewees have also mentioned the German strict order (Ordnung), 
punctuality and cleanliness. According to one respondent, even the inside of a 
German tank was clean and tidy.49 Several interviewees believed that under 
German rule, criminality was successfully eliminated. At the same time, several 
interviewees were shocked by the cruelty of German officers who punished child 
thieves by chopping off their hands,50 which they explained with the German 
aversion against theft.
Others remembered the Germans’ fine uniforms and professional equipment with 
admiration and counterposed it to the rather poor view of the Red Army soldiers. 
A woman even called the Germans “a beautiful nation.”51 Another recalled: 
They were very accurate. They took care of their external appearance. Even 
though I was still young, I noticed that. Even if it was wartime and they were in 
a foreign country, they took great care in their appearance.52
Many contemporary witnesses noticed a particular honesty and love of order in 
the Germans, in contrast to their Italian and Rumanian allies who were purported 
to be thieves. Even though the German occupying forces took away all of the 
population’s possessions, they did this, according to one interviewee, 
not like thieves. […] They took everything they liked directly in front of the 
population, because they were convinced that it was supposed to be like that and 
it was according to the rules.
Thus, in retrospect, the interviewee considered the Germans’ lacking awareness 
of wrongdoing in a positive way and as particularly honest and orderly behaviour. 
The Italian and Rumanian soldiers, however, were often stereotyped as “thieves 
and robbers.” At the same time, it can be observed that the perception of the Italian 
soldiers was often generally more positive than that of the German ones The 
Italians were apparently regarded as less violent, always cheerful, fond of children 
and very religious. They allegedly had a strong weakness for the local women. This 
– on the whole more positive – perception can presumably be explained by their 
lower level of indoctrination as well as the fact that they, as a rule, did not take part 
in punitive measures against the population.
49. Interview with Boris R. (1933), recorded in February 2005 in Donets´k.
50. Interview with Evgenii F. (1931), recorded in April 2005 in Donets´k; Interview with 
Viktor S. (1929), recorded in October 2004 in Donets´k.
51. Interview with Nina K. (1931), recorded in December 2004 in Konstantinovka.
52. Interview with Taina C. (1932), recorded in July 2003 in Donets´k.
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Most interviewees perceived the local policemen and collaborators as even 
worse than the German occupiers. Thus the interviewees made statements like the 
following: 
The Germans were better than our policemen – those bootlickers that tortured 
us. They were worse than the Germans. They were Germans after all, the others 
were ours.53 
Or: 
All the repulsion, all the repulsive behaviour came from the side of the local 
inhabitants, from those who wanted to serve the Germans. For them, denouncing 
somebody was a heroic deed.54 
Local collaborators were said to be particularly cruel and corrupt. With them, the 
population was able to buy itself off with money and goods, whereas, in several 
respondents’ views, “a German would not have got involved with that kind of 
thing.”55 Several interviewees reported that local policemen simply took food and 
other property from the population. For example, they took away the bread people 
had traded for goods in villages several walk days away. Here, many interviewees 
supposed that the local collaborators had different motives for their actions, from 
hatred toward the Soviet authorities that was often based on the repressions suffered 
in the 1930s to a fight for bare survival. A few interviewees added that even among 
the collaborators, there were some who tried to act for the good of the population.56
Several interviewees reported about postwar criminal convictions of local 
collaborators whose logic evaded them. Thus, some who had behaved in a 
particularly gruesome way towards the population stayed at large, whereas others 
were sentenced to long periods in camps.57 What is interesting here is that many 
local inhabitants were aware of those postwar trials, which were mostly closed to 
the public and rarely reported on by the press. Locally, this sort of information 
quickly spread among neighbours by word of mouth. The participation of local 
witnesses in the trials may have played a role as well. While there has been at least 
a limited local exchange about collaboration among the people here, the topic – 
until the recent past – has been for the most part excluded from the official media 
coverage and remembrance culture regarding World War II.58
53. Interview with Nikolai T. (1925), recorded in April 2004 in Donets´k.
54. Interview with Lev V. (1924), recorded in May 2005 in Donets´k.
55. Interview with Evgenii F. (1931), recorded in April 2005 in Donets´k.
56. Interview with Ivan K. (1931), recorded in November 2003 in Donets´k.
57. Interview with Liliia K. (1926), recorded in January 2005 in Donets´k.
58. Tanja Penter, “Local Collaborators on Trial. Soviet War Crimes Trials under Stalin 
(1943-1953),” Cahiers du Monde russe, 49, 2-3 (2008): 341-364.
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Interrelating experiences under Stalinist and Nazi rule
Interestingly, many interviewees – though this was not an explicit question – 
mentioned crimes of the Stalinist regime next to German crimes and drew certain 
comparisons between Nazi and Stalinist rule. Among the Stalinist crimes, many 
interviewees especially mentioned the shooting of demonstrating workers who 
protested against the destruction of the coal mines during the Red Army’s retreat; 
the execution of several hundred prisoners by the NKVD, the shootings of supposed 
collaborators by the Red Army and the NKVD after liberation, the Soviet bombing 
of civilian houses in occupied territories, the manmade hunger of 1932-1933 or 
the Great Terror of 1937-1938. Several interviewees referred to new Ukrainian 
publications about the Stalinist crimes of the 1930s and mentioned that they only 
recently learned about them. Here the influence of post-Soviet media publications 
on individual memory narratives becomes visible.
A few interviewees quite openly admitted that part of the population in the 
occupied territories welcomed the German occupiers with bread and salt and had 
high expectations of them (which of course were soon disappointed): 
The people were waiting for the Germans because they wanted a change. 
Here, shootings and repressions took place before the war, in 1937 and 1938.59
Others talked about the indifference of Soviet citizens towards the changing powers 
and emphasized that, from the perspective of their everyday life experience, there 
were few differences between Stalinism and National Socialism. In some respects, 
the Germans even appeared in a more positive light than the Stalinist regime. 
One interviewee stated: 
I did not see that the fascists beat their own people. The Germans only murdered 
foreigners, but ours murdered their own people. So what is better – fascism or 
communism?60 
To some interviewees, German occupation in retrospective seemed to present a real 
power alternative, even somehow, a lost historical chance. Therefore, statements 
like the following appeared in some of the interviews: 
If the Germans had treated the Russian people better, they probably would have 
won the war. […] If there had not been this cruelty and roughness, everything 
would have turned out differently. Hitler was such an idiot. If he had not morally 
disappointed the people so much, he would have won. That’s for sure.61 
59. Interview with Ivan S. (1925), recorded in October 2004 in Donets´k.
60. Interview with Ivan S. (1925), recorded in October 2004 in Donets´k.
61. Interview with Nikolai O. (1931), recorded in July 2003 in Donets´k.
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Another interviewee mainly attributed the Germans’ failure to their inhuman 
treatment of the prisoners of war. He concluded that they would have won the war 
if they had treated the prisoners of war better: 
Then they would not have had any enemies in the occupied territories. Then 
they would have been able to champion their cause on and on and on. 
They might have even beaten the Americans and totally plundered America. 
Then they would have had everything. But they made this mistake.62
Refiguration of memory – a re-evaluation of history?
How do narratives about good Germans fit German hunger policies, deportations, 
mass graves and – according to the Soviet Extraordinary Commission accounts 
– more than 320,000 dead civilians and Soviet prisoners of war in the Donbass? 
Our thesis is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the following political, 
economic and social transformations in certain groups of the war generation, a 
refiguration and re-evaluation of the German occupation in World War II took 
place.63 The horrors of the occupation were put into perspective with regard to the 
crimes of Stalinism that Ukrainians had learned about in the media after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union on the one hand – and with regard to the stressful political, 
economic and social transformations on the other hand. It is also possible that the 
two German compensation programmes for the victims of National Socialism, 
especially forced labourers in Ukraine, Russia and Belorussia, have contributed to 
improving the Germans’ image among the war generation.
It must be noted that during the interviews, several interviewees suddenly 
switched from their reports about war times to their poor living situation of the 
time, thereby creating a sort of implicit connection between these two very different 
experiences. This subjective interrelation of the two experiences becomes obvious 
in statements like the following: 
These were interesting years. Very interesting. And now I am sometimes 
thinking how easy it was at that time.64 
One interviewee stated: 
Perestroika has been going on for a long time. The Soviet Union just fell to 
pieces under our eyes. Back then we had a government and then suddenly it was 
62. Interview with Ivan S. (1925), recorded in October 2004 in Donets´k.
63. The connection between war memories and actual self-perceptions and life perspectives has 
long been recognized. See for example Robin Lohmann, Gereon Heuft, “Autobiographisches 
Gedächtnis und aktuelle Lebensperspektive im Alter. Eine empirische Studie biographisch 
rekonstruierter Kriegserfahrungen,” BIOS, 9, 1 (1996): 59-73.
64. Interview with Iakov G. (1924), recorded in October 2001 in Donets´k.
20 TANJA PENTER, DMITRII TITARENKO
no more. Who is ruling now, we don’t know. Where we are going now, we don’t 
know either.65 
Statements like these show the deep uncertainty and disorientation of the war 
generation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many elderly people in Ukraine 
experienced a decline in their living conditions and general status in society.66 
Sometimes, the new debates about remembrance policies in independent Ukraine 
were quite confusing for the older generation, as one interviewee recalled: 
I must tell you that I sometimes sleep very badly at night. Quite often, everything 
is mixed up in my head. You know, the years and times mix up when I read in 
the newspapers and journals that […] that war was neither great nor a patriotic 
war, as many people write nowadays.67 
One interviewee even came to a surprising comparison between the experience of 
German occupation and the experience of post-Soviet transformations and uttered: 
The end of communism was more frightening than fascism.68 
These statements indicate that the interviewees have experienced several more or 
less traumatic situations, and the period of German rule was only one of them. 
No less stressful for some of the interviewees were the experiences under Stalinist 
rule and the latest transformations after the end of the Soviet Union. Interviewees 
tended to interrelate all these different experiences in their narratives.
Some interviewees in retrospective glorified the solidarity of Soviet wartime 
society:
People were totally different. They shared everything. […] People were much 
more good-hearted than today. They were poor, but morally they were totally 
different people.69 
This perception is in conflict with the common practice of denunciation under 
German occupation reported by several interviewees: 
Denunciation was everywhere. If somebody did not like someone else, he 
just wrote a note and the police took the person away and started to torture 
65. Interview with Grigorii T., recorded in October 2004 in the village Novobakhmutovka, 
Donets´k region.
66. Aleksandr Sidorenko, “Faktizität und Geltung. Altenpolitik im postsowjetischen Raum,” 
Osteuropa, 60, 5 (2010): 131-141.
67. Interview with Zoia Tch. (1929) recorded in February 2005 in Donets´k.
68. Interview with Boris R. (1933), recorded in February 2005 in Donets´k.
69. Interview with Zoia Tch. (1929), recorded in February 2005 in Donets´k.
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them. […] Everybody wrote lies about everybody. Because there had been an 
announcement: denouncing a partisan was rewarded with a cow.70 
Another interviewee recalled: 
Somebody wanted an apartment or house or something like this. He wrote a 
denouncement. Without any proof the person was arrested and put in prison. 
That’s what it was like at that time.71
We can thus conclude that at least in some interviews a certain refiguration of 
memory and a more positive evaluation of the period of German occupation and 
the German occupiers (in combination with the forgetting of German crimes) has 
taken place. It is also noticeable that some interviewees who were deported as 
forced labourers to Germany and received a compensation payment also had a 
more positive image of the Germans today, as one interviewee mentioned: 
It was Germany that gave me money. Ours would never have given me anything. 
[…] No, I cannot say that I am resenting the Germans, only the Gestapo people 
who beat me with a whip.72 
Some of the former Ostarbeiter even recalled their experiences with forced labour 
in Germany in a rather positive way. One interviewee said that in Germany, he had 
“learned to work well and conscientiously.”73 Another mentioned: “I was there and 
at least I saw something from the world. I saw how good people can live.”74
This refiguration of memory seems to be connected with the various painful 
transformation processes which took place in Ukrainian society after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. And in this respect, it shows the various new social and cultural 
interactions and communications as well as the influence of media and official 
remembrance policies in independent Ukraine. It also indicates, to some extent, 
how the war generation coped with these various changes. There seems to be a 
correlation between the lack of orientation, social status, and poor living conditions 
of many elderly people in post-Soviet Ukraine75 and their accounts about the past. 
And it may not be accidental that in times of felt disorder and disorientation, some 
70. Interview with Evgenii F. (1931), recorded in April 2005 in Donets´k.
71. Interview with Boris R. (1933), recorded in February 2005 in Donets´k.
72. Interview with Maruia B. (1923), recorded in July 2009 in Zatish´e, Raion Volnovakha, 
Donets´k region.
73. Interview with Efim G. (1933), recorded in August 2010 in Donets´k.
74. Interview with Olga U. (1926), recorded in July 2009 in Belogorovka, Raion Artemovsk, 
Donets´k region.
75. For the bad economic situation of the war generation in Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia see 
the volume “Altersbilder. Kriegserinnerungen, Demographie und Altenpolitik,” Osteuropa, 60, 
5 (2010).
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interviewees recalled the cruel but strict and seemingly reliable orderliness under 
German occupation in a positive way.
At the same time, we must also consider the possibility that these perspectives 
on the past may be specific to those who did not suffer most under the German terror 
regime. They may also be specific to the younger generation, who experienced the 
war as children and young adults. Last, we do not know whether these apparently 
new narratives about the occupation are really the result of recent refigurations of 
memory after the collapse of the Soviet Union, or have in fact existed for decades 
inside the families and can only today be openly expressed by the interviewees. We 
must also bear in mind that a more positive picture of the Germans had already been 
propagated by the Soviet media since the 1950s with regard to the new “socialist 
brothers” in the GDR. However, detailed research on this question is still lacking.
Conclusion
In Ukraine, the stormy period of transformation after the end of the Soviet Union 
was a period of changes in remembrance policies and official memory culture. 
Since Ukrainian independence, the memory culture about the Second World War 
has changed significantly. At first, starting in the early 1990s, Ukrainian national 
historians interpreted the War under a new national paradigm. The underground 
fight of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) received special 
attention. However, the question of Ukrainian collaboration and participation in 
the execution of Jews has remained a blemish and a taboo topic in historiography.76 
The often mentioned split between memory culture on the war in Eastern and 
Western Ukraine seems to be only partly true today. In fact, the Ukrainian memory 
landscape has become much more pluralistic and diverse in the last years and cannot 
be reduced to Eastern Ukrainian “Soviet” and Western Ukrainian “nationalist” 
memories.77 This finds confirmation in our oral history project in the Donbass. 
The project has discovered local counternarratives about war and postwar 
experiences which are counterposed to the former official Soviet memory culture. 
Whereas such counternarratives might be expected in Western Ukraine, it may 
be surprising to find them in the Eastern Ukrainian Donbass region, which had 
always been a showcase for Stalinist industrialisation and a traditional stronghold 
of Soviet power, and counted a large Russian minority among its population. 
This indicates that the often described “war of memory” between Eastern and 
Western Ukraine does not exist. 
The same observations have been made by researchers studying post-Soviet 
memory cultures in the Western Ukrainian city of Lviv. While a heroic memory of 
76. Wilfried Jilge, “Nationalukrainischer Befreiungskampf. Die Umwertung des Zweiten 
Weltkriegs in der Ukraine,” Osteuropa, 58, 6 (2008): 167-186.
77. Andrij Portnov, “Pluralität der Erinnerung. Denkmäler und Geschichtspolitik in der 
Ukraine,” Osteuropa, 58, 6 (2008): 197-210.
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Ukrainian nationalism in the Second World War dominated the post-Soviet memory 
culture in Lviv during the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, today a 
growing local public sphere, alternative discourses and local influences on memory 
culture have come to the fore in the city.78 Thus, it seems that throughout occupied 
Ukraine, people have shared everyday life experiences under Nazi and Stalinist rule 
which today might be part of a more integrated memory culture.
Let us now draw attention to one other observation about what we can learn 
from the interviews: last but not least, they show us the complexity of wartime 
biographies and experiences which often do not fit into narrow frames of 
interpretation. Research on the wartime Soviet Union was for decades dominated by 
a certain vision that reproduced the manichaeistic pattern of Soviet historiography 
and divided Soviet citizens into nationalists, collaborators, resisters or victims. 
Moreover, all of these phenomena were mostly studied separately. We learn from 
the interviews that loyalties were rather fragile and changed quite frequently during 
the war. The sharp lines of definition and categorisation which historians (as well as 
the architects of compensation programmes) have created in dealing with the past 
do not fit wartime reality. Many people collaborated at one time and participated in 
Soviet resistance or fought in the Red Army at another. There were no clear lines 
between collaboration and resistance, but rather moral grey zones. The different 
phenomena were in fact much more dynamic and intermingled than historians have 
noticed so far. Experiences of the occupation were diverse, and besides, experiences 
of terror and violence also included cultural and working experiences as well as 
various personal relationships with the German enemy. Therefore we would argue 
for much more integrated research approaches trying to combine the wide range 
of different wartime experiences. In that respect, interviews with witnesses can be 
particularly helpful.
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